Taiwan Today

On December 16, 1991, mainland China set up the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, a "civil" organization of roughly the same stature as Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, which was founded in March 1991. In accordance with the Guidelines for National Unification, the ROC government has insisted that in the initial phase of cross-straits' exchange, official contact is impossible. Therefore, disputes that might arise as a result of increased contact across the Straits might best be handled by intermediary civil organizations.

The establishment of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits by the Chinese Communists reflects the success of Taiwan's mainland policy and Guidelines for National Unification as well as the flexibility and the readiness of the mainland in dealing with Taiwan. The establishment of the association means that cross-straits' relations have entered a new phase in development. Policy makers can now consider the future direction of relations, what interactions are appropriate in this new environment, and what strategic impact these will have on Taiwan.

The United Daily News, published in Taipei, invited several experts to discuss these questions. The panel included: C. V. Chen (陳長文), secretary-general, Straits Exchange Foundation; Yang Kai-huang (楊開煌), associate professor, Department of Political Science, Soochow University; Lee Ying-ming (李英明), associate professor, Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University; Lin Bih-jaw ( 李碧炤 ), director, Institute of International Relations; Wu Yu-shan (吳玉山), visiting professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University; Chen Te-sheng (陳德昇), associate research fellow, Institute of International Relations; and Chao Chun-shan (趙春山), deputy director, Institute of International Relations.
The following is an abridged translation of the discussion as printed in the United Daily News (December 14-18, 1991).

C. V. Chen: When the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) met for the first time with the Taiwan Affairs Office of mainland China's State Council in April 1991, we briefed them on the background for the establishment of the SEF. We stressed in particular that in the initial phase of cross-straits contact—the short term phase of people-to-people exchanges mentioned in the Guidelines for National Unification when exchange between people is expanding, but when official contact is not allowed—there had arisen a number of issues in need of resolution and many constructive plans in need of implementation. The resolution of problems and the implementation of plans required the involvement of the government and the public. The SEF was established because official contact is needed to regulate exchanges between people, but under circumstances in which such official contact is impossible. Given this state of affairs, we hoped the mainland would understand our position and give their approval.

At the time, they made it clear that they had not· yet considered setting up an office similar to the SEF during this phase, and that the SEF could contact the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council directly. Tang Shu-pei, deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, also said they would welcome contact with the SEF, as well as any other non-governmental organization from the Taiwan area. We can see that, from their point of view, they believed it was unnecessary to set up a nongovernmental organization similar to the SEF at that time, nor did they feel it was necessary for us to set up the foundation, because they advocated official contacts.

Last November, the SEF visited the mainland again to discuss mutual cooperation to prevent crimes on the high seas, the verification of documents, and providing legal assistance for people arrested on suspicion of crimes during humanitarian visits. At that time, various mainland departments, such as the judiciary, the people's court, the procuratorate, and the public security bureau all said we should contact them directly, that is through direct official contact. The direction of their policy and the order of their priorities were very clear: they did not see the necessity of an office similar to the foundation.

In the last year or so, the foundation's plans and work have not gone very smoothly, and we have put in a great deal of effort for the little we have achieved. A number of incidents involving fishing boats have occurred. The mainland lumps all these problems together, and adding their own considerations, they cannot respond to many of our plans. So when we arrived in November, they told us that the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) would be set up by the end of the month, but it wasn't until December 16 that it was actually established. Though it came a month late, it was nevertheless set up. The mainland obviously feels the official contact they desire is not enough. Insufficient contact has resulted in the suspension of many cross-straits' activities. Though the contacts between the Taiwan Affairs Office and the SEF bring some functions into play, still, many plans are left unfulfilled. This is in part due to the status of (mainland) offices which sign agreements with us. If we look at the agreement signed by the Red Cross associations from both sides of the Taiwan Straits on Quemoy in September, 1990, we see that they are organizations of equivalent stature.

But the Taiwan Affairs Office still has many qualms about dealing with the SEF. The SEF for its part has a number of cases concerning the verification of documents and high-seas crimes. This time we discussed procedural questions, and they indicated that in the future a newly-established civil organization would be entrusted to hold talks with the foundation. Apparently they consider our way of doing things more practical, and therefore they agreed. We feel this is an encouraging sign, requiring a positive response. Relations across the Taiwan Straits are fairly complicated, so we must look in the most promising direction.

From their latest facsimile transmissions we know that they are stressing the aims and goals of the ARATS in improving Taiwan-mainland relations, the augmentation of cross-straits exchanges, and national unification. And we also understand that though the association is a civil organization, the range of its activities is actually much broader than that of the SEF. Because the SEF, in its reciprocal relations with the ARATS, is restricted in terms of function, regulations, and commission, it cannot carry out policies as consistently, systematically, and as smoothly as the ARATS can under their system. There are a number of areas where functions do not mutually overlap, so it is difficult to reach an accord. Given the structure of the mainland and the background of the establishment of the ARATS, we should not use the accustomed legal standpoint to examine, analyze, and ascertain whether or not it really is a civil or an official organization. This would only dampen their enthusiasm. It should be determined broadly from the angle of a civil organization. If they plan to visit Taiwan or even to set up branch offices in Taiwan within the limits of our policy and the law, then we should look at this from the angle of the short-term goal of people-to-people exchanges across the Taiwan Straits, and put all our efforts into bringing it about.

People-to-people exchanges across the Straits can help decrease hostilities, and can help in the middle phase of national unification and in the reaching of long-term goals. The SEF hopes that it can keep entering the mainland and strengthening contacts at all levels there.

In short, ideology must temporarily be put aside in cross-straits exchanges. In the present phase we must find areas for practical cooperation. In dealing with the mainland, I believe we ought to adopt a more open position, one that does not threaten security, but which would allow more mainland Chinese to visit Taiwan to understand its development.

Yang Kai-huang: Communist China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits is the counterpart of our Straits Exchange Foundation. Though both are civil organizations, they actually differ in four respects.

First, the backgrounds of their establishment are different. The SEF was set up by the ROC government in response to the ever increasing number of disputes across the Taiwan Straits. Thus the foundation is basically service-oriented. But the Chinese Communist's ARATS was conceived as a strategy by which the Chinese Communists could implement their Taiwan policy. It may be the most active expression of their united front policy, which will make the association basically aggressive and initiative-oriented. Naturally, this orientation does not necessarily preclude it from achieving its mission of "serving the people of Taiwan."

Second, the types of personnel on both sides are different. The SEF is basically nongovernmental and civilian-oriented with "civilians in place of officials." Thus tensions may develop between the foundation and the government agencies which restrict the foundation's independent authority. Furthermore, the SEF personnel are given jobs as a reward for service—they are not professional experts. In the ARATS, officials are disguised as civilians. Communist officials take off their uniforms and play the part of civilians. In terms of personnel they form a united front: experts are drawn from foreign affairs, the Taiwan Affairs Office, and the Fukien clique of Wang Chao-kuo. Therefore, in executing the strategy of the Chinese Communists, in grasping principles, and in tactics, they are in a comparatively better position to handle the principles of policy and can be more flexible in executing them.

Third, in looking at future tasks, though the SEF hopes to serve the people of mainland China, we are facing a highly autocratic society, one which adopts an entirely aggressive style in dealing with a pluralistic and changing society. This is why the ARATS may make many links with nongovernmental organizations in Taiwan. In other words, the SEF could end up dealing with the ARATS only, while the ARATS may develop other relations in Taiwan.

Fourth, they are different in their policy-making roles. Because the SEF is service-oriented, it doesn't have much say in policy making. On the other hand, because the ARATS is carrying out a mission of aggression, and because of its stronger personnel, it has a great deal of input in the formulation of Taiwan policy and in carrying out work related to Taiwan.

Popular support for the SEF differs greatly from the ARATS. That is, every time the foundation goes to the mainland, people in Taiwan wonder if they are selling out the island, or if they are bearing some message. This kind of doubt doesn't exist for the ARATS.

Lee Ying-ming: The Mainland Affairs Council recently passed revisions to the draft of the Statutes Governing the Relations Between the People of Taiwan and Mainland Areas to provide a legal loophole for allowing intermediary organizations from mainland China to set up branch offices in Taiwan. However, this may not be enough to allow us to fully control the development of the mainland's intermediary organizations. For example, if other nongovernmental organizations in Taiwan request that their counterpart organizations on the mainland likewise be allowed to set up branch offices in Taiwan, then what will we do?

The Chinese Communists have announced that the Straits Exchange Foundation will not be the exclusive contact organization of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. Therefore we must think about setting standards in advance for contact between other intermediary organizations in Taiwan and the ARATS. For instance, we can rule that any agreements between the ARATS and any nongovernmental organization in Taiwan other than the SEF will be legally ineffective. This, however, leads to another problem: since the establishment of the ARATS, the SEF will have to deal with more complicated exchanges across the Straits, and the SEF will not be able to solve many problems on its own.

Perhaps the Mainland Affairs Council should consider permitting the SEF along with other intermediary organizations in Taiwan to solve problems when necessary. That is, decision makers in Taiwan must consider setting up a combined intermediary organization led by the SEF. This would allow intermediary organizations other than the foundation to provide additional assistance by acting as a bridge between the ARATS and the foundation when necessary. Otherwise, the Chinese Communists may use other intermediary organizations from Taiwan as pawns to apply pressure on the Mainland Affairs Council.

In this instance, the Chinese Communists have made use of the situation to set up the ARATS, displaying a so-called practical goodwill while at the same time having a subtle united front effect. This may cause a subtle change in the relationship between the Mainland Affairs Council and the foundation, even to the extent of inducing the SEF to force the Mainland Affairs Council to make policy decisions more quickly. The Mainland Affairs Council and the SEF may have to resolve their differences on questions such as how to determine the status of the ARATS, when its members will be allowed to come to Taiwan, and in what capacity.

In order to respond to the circumstances outlined above, the Mainland Affairs Council must strengthen its coordination with the SEF. A clause should also be added to the foundation's rules of supervision stipulating the limits for interaction between the SEF and the ARATS. For example, it should be stipulated that the SEF can interact with the ARATS only with the authorization of the Mainland Affairs Council. But here, it is imperative that the Mainland Affairs Council understand the limits of the association's powers and reassess and modify the powers of the SEF accordingly. The Mainland Affairs Council should also consider requiring that all agreements signed by the SEF and the ARATS be submitted to the Legislative Yuan for approval. The Chinese Communist's ARATS should also be requested to submit all related documents to the People's Congress for approval to certify the legality of these agreements.

Lin Bih-jaw: The Straits Exchange Foundation has three special characteristics. First, the SEF is aboveboard in its personnel, funding, organization, and media interviews. Second, it was formed only after consultation and debate among businessmen, administrative officials, and opinion leaders. Third, the process of policy making is responsive rather than aggressive. The SEF was created primarily for humanitarian reasons. Trade, travel, documentary certification, and other objective needs were secondary.

The ARATS' policy making process is relatively secretive and it doesn't seem to have clear supervision. It plans according to its needs, and outside pressure is comparatively light. In the process of decision making, the ARATS merely follows orders. Principles are decided from above, and the ARATS determines the means of implementation for itself. In considering policy, the SEF emphasizes legality, general affairs, and service, whereas the ARATS emphasizes politics and a united front. In the future, the ARATS will have greater latitude for maneuvering than the foundation, and it will have more opportunities for "attack."

In examining the roles and positions of the two organizations, we are not sure whether the ARATS can really match the SEF, or whether they are compatible in terms of range of function and activity. For Taiwan, the SEF is a civil organization; but for the moment the ARATS is wearing "white gloves." Its position will be clarified only after it has been operating for a while.

In short, the founding of the ARATS represents the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China. Both sides are experimenting, and we need more leeway to gain the upper hand in contact across the Straits.

Wu Yu-shan: Mainland China's establishment of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits on one hand reflects the success of the ROC government's mainland China policy; on the other, illustrates the flexibility of the mainland's Taiwan policy. While official contact is impossible, the establishment of the ARATS strengthens mainland's indirect contacts with our government. Since the thaw in relations across the Straits, the mainland has hoped that constant people-to-people contacts would create a relationship of functional interdependence, forcing us to have political contact with them. However, because our government is unwilling to have direct contact with Communist Chinese officials, it has tried to decrease interest in mainland China, limiting mutual relations to the indirect (i.e. indirect post, air, and trade).

Our government also established the Straits Exchange Foundation as a buffer zone. In this way, responsibility for functional problems is entrusted to a special organization by the government, thereby eliminating the need to face mainland China directly. For this reason, mainland China has used every possible means to increase the level of contact. They have continuously discussed "one China—two systems" with visiting members of the SEF. Owing to our fixed position, even if we had to endure a boycott by mainland China on functional problems, we would insist that the SEF, a nongovernmental organization, handle matters concerning the people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

The ARATS is our counterpart, and since the SEF has already sent staff members to the mainland to solve problems, the ARATS can make a similar request. At the same time, our side has also mentioned that there is no problem for civil intermediary organizations from both sides to set up offices. Thus the ARATS is justified in requesting to establish permanent offices in Taipei and other parts of Taiwan, which isn't exactly what we had in mind. The establishment of the ARATS, though satisfying our demands for unofficial contact, may give the mainland too much power in Taiwan. This has raised concern inside and outside our government.

From this perspective, if the ARATS as a civil organization is entrusted by the Taiwan Affairs Office to handle functional problems, then our side would be quite happy. But what we are worried about now is the question of "reciprocal contact." We heartily welcome the establishment of the ARATS, but we will also restrict visits and the setting up of offices as long as it is to our advantage. In the past, Mr. C. V. Chen had to make contact with mainland officials because there was no ARATS. Today, both sides have intermediary organizations, and the ARATS can contact the SEF without having to contact the ROC government.

Chen Te-sheng: In observing cross-straits economics and trade relations since the founding of the ARATS, I have a number of ideas.

First, the aim in establishing the ARATS is more political in function than economic. In determining economic and trade policy with Taiwan, priority will still be given to serving the political interests of the Chinese Communists. In other words, the principles of "politics through economics," and "unification through communication" stated by Yang Shang-kun at a meeting on Taiwan affairs will be the highest guiding principles for the ARATS in playing its two important roles in economics and politics.

Second, a trade office will be set up within the ARATS to provide information for Taiwan businessmen and solve the difficulties likely to be encountered by Taiwan businessmen on the mainland. The ARATS will play a substantial role in facilitating direct trade and investment across the straits.

Third, the establishment of the ARATS will not likely result in extensive changes in the Chinese Communist's economic and trade policy towards Taiwan. For example, in the area of indirect trade, Chinese Communist policy towards Taiwan business at the beginning of the 1980s saw periods of preferential treatment as well as reductions. But since July 1, 1987, after implementing central administrative measures for regulating trade with Taiwan, all policy making authority in this area has been concentrated in the trade departments. In the past, preferential treatment was given to Taiwan investment across the board. But recently a restrictive investment policy has been adopted. Taiwan's investment in high-tech production, transportation, energy resources, and natural resources, are welcomed and receive preferential consideration whereas other areas are subject to increased restrictions.

Fourth, trade and economic relations across the Straits is expected to continue expanding. It is estimated that indirect trade last year exceeded US$5 billion, and direct Taiwan investment in the mainland exceeded US$2 billion. Therefore, as economic and trade contacts across the straits grow, Taiwan may become increasingly dependent economically on the mainland. Large scale Taiwan investment in mainland China might become a political bargaining chip for the Chinese Communists. Thus, sooner or later we will have to decide how to deal with the ARATS' actions concerning Taiwan trade and how to lessen the political hazards.

How are economic dependence and political relations linked? In looking at Tibet, we see a case of transfusion economics. Tibet is politically weak because it is entirely dependent on mainland China's assistance for its economic development. And if there is the slightest opposition to the Chinese Communists, the Communist regime will crush it. In looking at Hong Kong, we see that foreign investment is relatively high, lessening the level of economic dependence on southern China. But the approach of 1997 leaves them no say in the matter, because the Basic Law is controlled by the Chinese Communists. But turning to Taiwan we see that it is less dependent economically on mainland China than either Tibet or Hong Kong. Thus the Chinese Communists have given Taiwan a greater latitude politically and economically. Under these circumstances, if economic dependence on the mainland does develop, then the Chinese Communists will likely change their political stance towards Taiwan.

What impact will the establishment of the ARATS have on Taiwan? First we have to consider the difference in political systems and territorial size on both sides of the Straits. For example, if the ARATS establishes twelve branch offices in Taiwan, then their political effect would be greater than the political influence of a similar number of SEF branch offices on the mainland. In addition, Taiwan's media is also more developed. When the ARATS sets up an office in Taiwan it will become a media focal point, increasing its impact. But the mainland's media is fairly controlled, so our influence there will be restricted. Therefore, in setting up offices, their regional effect must be considered.

The Chinese Communists might use the weak points in Taiwan's democratic society and the special quality of our media to enhance the influence of the ARATS. If we simply adopt a policy of "reciprocity," then the effect of the SEF will be diminished. Besides, while the ARATS is building its effectiveness, it's quite possible that it may speed up alliances with special interest groups, influential spokesmen, and people with a similar political stance to put more pressure on Taipei.

Chao Chun-shan: Based on my observations, the government's Guidelines for National Unification is a political document, the contents of which limit the course of development in relations across the Straits. The short-term phase set up by the guidelines gives the responsibility of defending the people's rights on both sides of the straits to intermediary organizations. From this it can be seen that intermediary organizations are clearly functional organizations for solving problems. The Guidelines for National Unification set a number of preconditions for entering the medium term, such as: the mainland should push forward economic reform, gradually lift restrictions on public opinion, implement democratic rule of law, use peaceful means to solve all conflicts, and abide by mutual respect and non-exclusion in international relations. As far as I can tell, these conditions are all subjectively maintained. If we believe that the development of Communist China does not meet our demands, then the exchanges between the two sides will remain stalled at this short-term phase, and the intermediary organizations will carry out the same functional duties. Thus, if we carefully analyze the Guidelines for National Unification, we see it has strategic implications. We ourselves decide at what level cross-straits relations are to exist. Then we must ask, is this strategy necessary? I myself believe that it is for a very important reason. The problem of national identity must be solved, and at the same time we need time to observe the development of Communist China.

Since the ARATS is an organization set up by the Chinese Communists for strategic considerations, it is meaningless to try to determine if it is really a civil organization. The questions of whether or not its representatives will be able to come to Taiwan, in what capacity, whether their activities can be regulated by law, and whether they should be allowed to set up branch offices can all be solved when the Legislative Yuan passes the Statutes Governing the Relations Between the People of Taiwan and Mainland Areas. The establishment of branch offices involves political problems embodying a number of contradictions. We have always emphasized equity and reciprocity in relations with the mainland. At present KMT members can go to mainland China, while members of the Chinese Communist Party can't come to Taiwan. Is this equity?